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Don’t Tell Your Boss? Blowing the Whistle on the Fifth
Circuit’s Elimination of Anti-Retaliation Protection for
Internal Whistleblowers Under Dodd-Frank
I. Introduction: A Crisis and a Response
The financial crisis that began in 2008 was the worst since the Great
Depression. 1 Unemployment skyrocketed—more than doubling from 5% in
December 2007 to 10% in October 2009. 2 The stock market tumbled, with
the S&P 500 falling from over 1500 points in October 2007 to below 700
points by February 2009. 3 The crash destroyed as much as 45% of the
world’s wealth within a year and a half. 4 Making matters worse, the
recovery from the crisis was the slowest of any recession in the past forty
years: forty-seven months into the recession, employment remained 4%
lower than when the crisis began. 5
In the face of this crisis, Congress responded swiftly to prevent a future
one. Passed by Congress in 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) enacts several sweeping changes to
the financial industry. 6 The law’s stated purposes are to “promote the
financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and
transparency in the financial system” and “to protect consumers from
abusive financial services practices.”7 Among its many provisions are
incentives and protections for whistleblowers. Dodd-Frank increases
incentives for whistleblowers through a bounty system that rewards

1. Bob Willis, U.S. Recession Worst Since Great Depression, Revised Data Show,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 1, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid
=aNivTjr852TI.
2. Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Recession of 2007-2009, BLS SPOTLIGHT ON
STATISTICS 1, 2 (Feb. 2012), http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2012/recession/pdf/recession_bls_
spotlight.pdf.
3. Caroline Valetkevitch, Key Dates and Milestones in the S&P 500’s History,
REUTERS (May 6, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/06/us-usa-stocks-sp-time
line-idUSBRE9450WL20130506.
4. Megan Davies & Walden Siew, 45 Percent of World’s Wealth Destroyed:
Blackstone CEO, REUTERS (Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/10/usblackstone-idUSTRE52966Z20090310.
5. The Recession of 2007-2009, supra note 2, at 7.
6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th
Cong. (2010).
7. Id.
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whistleblower tips and provides protection for whistleblowers by shielding
them from employer retaliation.8
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Asadi v. GE Energy, however,
dramatically and incorrectly decreased Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation
protections for whistleblowers who report potential violations to their
employer instead of to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 9
This decision ignores the text of the statute, its legislative history, and the
consequences of limiting Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation protections to
external whistleblowers. In fact, whistleblowers play a critical role in the
early detection of fraud.10
Part II of this Note analyzes the anti-retaliation provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley) and Dodd-Frank, as well as
their related administrative rules. Part III examines the facts, holding, and
rationale of the Fifth Circuit’s decision. Part IV explores the reasons why
the Fifth Circuit’s decision was incorrect (1) as a matter of statutory
interpretation, (2) in light of the purpose of Dodd-Frank, (3) because of the
benefits of internal reporting, and (4) for failing to defer to the SEC. Part IV
advances a novel proposal that would allow the SEC to circumvent the Fifth
Circuit’s opinion by administrative rule and ensure the protection of
internal whistleblowers.
II. Law Before Asadi v. GE Energy: Broad Protection for Internal
Whistleblowers Under Both Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank
Although the whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank are similar to
those of Sarbanes-Oxley, they differ in significant ways. For example,
Dodd-Frank contains an explicit definition of the term whistleblower,
whereas Sarbanes-Oxley merely specifies protected activities.11 DoddFrank also expands whistleblower protection and incentives by providing a
longer statute of limitations, 12 permitting direct access to federal court, 13
and implementing a bounty program. 14 Perhaps most significantly,
whistleblowers are protected when they report violations that would be

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b), (h) (2012).
See Asadi v. GE Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013).
See infra Part IV.C.
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6), with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a).
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii), with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C).
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i).
Id. § 78u-6(b).
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similarly protected under Sarbanes-Oxley. 15 Therefore, the two statutes are
inexorably linked. Their similarities and differences are discussed below.
A. Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Provisions: Tell Your Boss
Sarbanes-Oxley provides broad whistleblower protections to employees
of publicly traded companies. 16 Sarbanes-Oxley does not contain an explicit
definition of the term whistleblower; instead, the statute describes the types
of employee activities that are protected against employer retaliation. 17
Specifically, Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits employers from discharging,
demoting, suspending, threatening, harassing, or discriminating against an
employee who provides information about any act that the employee
“reasonably believes constitutes a violation of . . . [statutes prohibiting mail
fraud; wire, radio, or television fraud; or commodities fraud], any rule or
regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of
Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.” 18 To benefit from these
anti-retaliation provisions, the employee can report the foregoing violations
to one of three entities: (1) the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA); (2) Congress; or (3) “a person with supervisory
authority over the employee.” 19 In other words, under Sarbanes-Oxley,
employee-whistleblowers may report potential violations externally, to a
regulatory agency or Congress, or internally, to a supervisor.
If an employee-whistleblower shows that she suffered retaliation at the
hands of her employer, Sarbanes-Oxley provides the employee with several
remedies. First, the employee is entitled to reinstatement to her previous job
with the same level of seniority as she had prior to the retaliation.20 Second,
the employee is entitled to back pay with interest.21 Third, the employee
can receive compensation for litigation costs, witness fees, and attorneys’
fees. 22 Notably, however, the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provisions
only protect employees from retaliation, and they do not provide any
incentive for employees to report potential violations.23

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a).
See id.
Id. § 1514A(a)(1).
Id. § 1514A(a)(1)(A)-(C); 29 C.F.R. § 1980.103(a)-(c) (2014).
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(A).
Id. § 1514A(c)(2)(B).
Id. § 1514A(c)(2)(C).
See id. § 1514A.
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In order to access these anti-retaliation remedies, the employee must first
prevail in an enforcement action against her employer, which requires
following the detailed process of administrative hurdles set forth below.
The employee can bring a claim in federal court only if the Department of
Labor (DOL) does not issue a final decision within 180 days of the filing of
the complaint. 24 Therefore, an employee must first exhaust all
administrative remedies before seeking relief in federal court. As discussed
below, Dodd-Frank allows an employee-whistleblower to skip these
administrative hurdles and file a claim directly in federal court. 25
Initially, an employee who believes that she has been retaliated against
must file a complaint with OSHA, the agency charged with enforcement of
Sarbanes-Oxley. 26 OSHA will not dismiss the complaint so long as the
employee meets the low burden of making a prima facie case of retaliation,
showing that (1) “[t]he employee engaged in a protected activity;” (2) the
employer “knew or suspected that the employee engaged in the protected
activity,” (3) “[t]he employee suffered an adverse action,” and (4) “[t]he
circumstances were sufficient to raise the inference that the protected
activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action.” 27 Once the
employee meets this low burden, OSHA will not dismiss the complaint
unless the employer can show by clear and convincing evidence that it
would have undertaken the adverse action regardless of the protected
activity. 28 If the employee makes a prima facie case and the employer
cannot meet its burden of proof, OSHA proceeds with an investigation. 29 If
OSHA finds reasonable cause to believe that the employee was retaliated
against, it issues relief. 30 This relief can be reviewed by an administrative
law judge (ALJ) and then again by the Administrative Review Board
(ARB) of the DOL upon party request. 31
Critically, under Sarbanes-Oxley the statute of limitations to file a claim
with OSHA is relatively short. The employee must file a claim within 180
days of the date of the reported violation (or within 180 days after the date
on which the employee became aware of the violation) or her retaliation

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. § 1514A(b)(1)(B).
See infra Part II.B.1.
29 C.F.R. §§ 1980.103(a)-(c).
Id. § 1980.104(e)(2).
Id. § 1980.104(e)(4).
Id. § 1980.104(e)(5).
Id. § 1980.105(a)(1).
Id. §§ 1980.107(b), 1980.110(a).
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claim is forever barred.32 In contrast, Dodd-Frank contains a significantly
longer statute of limitations. 33
B. Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions: Don’t Tell Your Boss?
1. Statutory Language: Confusion and Conflict
Dodd-Frank undoubtedly expands both the incentives for whistleblowers
to report violations and the protections afforded to certain whistleblowers
against anti-retaliation. Unlike Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank contains a
bounty reward program designed to incentivize employees to report
potential violations.34 Specifically, a whistleblower who “voluntarily
provide[s] original information . . . that [leads] to the successful
enforcement of the covered judicial or administrative action” is eligible to
receive an award of between 10% and 30% “of what has been collected of
the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related actions.”35
Therefore, Dodd-Frank offers an affirmative award to whistleblowers
whose information leads to successful enforcement actions, rather than
merely providing relief to employees that suffer retaliation.
Dodd-Frank also provides more extensive anti-retaliation provisions than
Sarbanes-Oxley in several ways. First, like Sarbanes-Oxley, it requires
reinstatement with the same seniority status and compensation for litigation
costs, including witness fees and attorneys’ fees. 36 But it expands on these
remedies by providing twice the amount of back pay that a whistleblower
would receive under Sarbanes-Oxley. 37 Second, Dodd-Frank eliminates the
administrative exhaustion requirement, allowing employees to bring their
claims directly to federal court. 38 Third, the statute of limitations is six
years after the date of the reported violation or three years after the date
when the violation was known or should have been known to the employee;
both of which are significantly longer than the 180-day statute of
limitations under Sarbanes-Oxley. 39
The debate, therefore, is not whether the whistleblower provisions of
Dodd-Frank are more whistleblower-friendly than those of Sarbanes-Oxley.
Instead, it is over who qualifies for the whistleblower protections of Dodd32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (2012).
See infra Part II.B.1.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (2012).
Id. § 78u-6(b)(1)(A)-(B).
Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(i), (iii).
Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(ii).
Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i).
Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii)(I)(aa)-(bb).
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Frank—specifically, who is included in Dodd-Frank’s definition of
whistleblower? Unlike Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank contains an explicit
definition of the term whistleblower. Dodd-Frank broadly defines a
whistleblower as “any individual who provides . . . information relating to a
violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established,
by rule or regulation, by the Commission.” 40 Dodd-Frank then describes the
whistleblower activities that are protected against retaliation, providing that
“[n]o employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly
or indirectly, or in any manner discriminate against, a whistleblower” who
(1) “provid[es] information to the Commission;” (2) “initiat[es], testif[ies]
in, or assist[s] in any investigation or judicial or administrative action of the
commission;” or, most significantly, (3) “mak[es] disclosures that are
required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . and any
other law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission.” 41
Two conclusions are clear from the statutory language. First, the general
definition of whistleblower requires that the employee report the suspected
securities violation directly to the SEC. This means that in order to benefit
from the Dodd-Frank bounty program, the whistleblower-employee must
report the violations directly to the SEC, rather than to her employer.
Second, and the focus of this Note, the scope of the employees who qualify
as whistleblowers for the purposes of the anti-retaliation provisions is not
immediately apparent. While the general definition of whistleblower
requires external reporting to the SEC, the anti-retaliation provisions also
provide protections to whistleblowers who make disclosures that are
protected under Sarbanes-Oxley, which specifically provides protection for
whistleblowers of public companies who report securities violations
internally.
2. Rules Promulgated by the SEC: (Attempted) Clarification
The SEC attempted to clarify this ambiguity by promulgating a rule
explaining the definition of whistleblower and the scope of the Dodd-Frank
anti-retaliation provisions. 42 According to the SEC, an employee generally
is a whistleblower if she provides information about a potential violation
directly to the SEC “[o]nline, through the Commission’s Web site” or “[b]y
mailing or faxing a Form TCR (Tip, Complaint or Referral).” 43 Therefore,
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. § 78u-6(a)(6).
Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (emphasis added).
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F1–2 (2014).
Id. § 240.21F–9(a)(1)-(2).
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the SEC’s general definition of whistleblower requires external reporting to
the SEC.
The SEC, however, refines the whistleblower definition for the purposes
of Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions. 44 Under the SEC’s definition,
an employee is a whistleblower if she “possess[es] a reasonable belief that
the information . . . [she is] providing relates to a possible securities law
violation” and “provide[s] that information in a manner described in [the
anti-retaliation provisions of Dodd-Frank].” 45 Again, the third category of
Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions shield whistleblowers who report
violations that are protected under the anti-retaliation provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley, which in turn protects whistleblowers that report
violations internally. 46 As the SEC explained in its commentary, “the rule
reflects the fact that the statutory anti-retaliation protections apply to three
different categories of whistleblowers, and the third category includes
individuals who report to persons or governmental authorities other than
the Commission.” 47 The SEC, therefore, interprets the Dodd-Frank antiretaliation provisions to apply to employees who internally report potential
securities violations.
3. District Court Opinions: Go Ahead, Tell Your Boss
Prior to Asadi, every district court to consider the issue agreed with the
SEC and determined that the anti-retaliation provisions of Dodd-Frank
applied to employees of public companies who internally reported
violations of securities laws pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley. 48
The district court in Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc. noted that Dodd-Frank
apparently conflicts with itself by requiring whistleblowers to report
violations directly to the SEC but also providing anti-retaliation protection
to whistleblowers that make disclosures protected under Sarbanes-Oxley. 49
The court ultimately held that “[t]he contradictory provisions of the DoddFrank Act are best harmonized by reading . . . [the anti-retaliation
provision’s] protection of certain whistleblower disclosures not requiring
44. See id. § 240.21F–2(b).
45. Id. § 240.21F–2(b)(1)(i)-(ii).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C) (2012).
47. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34304
(2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts 240, 249) (emphasis added).
48. See Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11CV1424 SRU, 2012 WL 4444820, at *4-5
(D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994
(M.D. Tenn. 2012); Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 LBS, 2011 WL 1672066,
at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
49. 2011 WL 1672066, at *4.
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reporting to the SEC as a narrow exception to . . . [the general] definition of
a whistleblower as one who reports to the SEC.” 50
The district court in Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp. observed that it was not
“unambiguously clear” that the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provisions only
apply to individuals who report directly to the Commission. 51 Such an
interpretation “would dramatically narrow . . . the protections available to
potential whistleblowers” because “an individual would [either have to]
submit the information online, through the Commission’s website, or by
mailing or faxing a [f]orm . . . . Mailing a regular letter is insufficient.” 52
This reading, the court concluded, “seems inconsistent with the goal of the
Dodd-Frank Act,” which is to “‘improve the accountability and
transparency of the financial system,’ and create ‘new incentives and
protections for whistleblowers.’” 53
Because the statutory language is ambiguous, the Kramer court then
turned to whether the SEC’s rule interpreting the statute was a permissible
construction. 54 The defendant-employer in the case argued that the SEC’s
rule is impermissible because it allows plaintiffs to pursue claims under
Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions that they would otherwise have to
pursue under Sarbanes-Oxley, which has a shorter statute of limitations and
requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies.55 The court, however,
rejected this argument and accepted the SEC’s interpretation of the statute
because “the Dodd-Frank Act appears to have been intended to expand
upon the protections of Sarbanes-Oxley, and thus the claimed problem is no
problem at all.” 56

50. Id. at *5. The Egan decision has strongly influenced later district courts. For
example, a second district court relied on Egan to similarly determine that “the third
category does not require that the whistleblower have interacted directly with the SEC—only
that the disclosure, to whomever made, was required or protected by certain laws within the
SEC’s jurisdiction.” Nollner, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 993 (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Accordingly, the plain terms of anti-retaliation category (iii), which do not
require reporting to the SEC, appear to conflict with the DFA definition of whistleblower.”
Id. at 944 n.9. “However, both Egan . . . and the SEC have found that category (iii) provides
a narrow exception to the definition of a whistleblower as someone who reports only ‘to the
Commission.’” Id.
51. 2012 WL 4444820, at *4.
52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting Asadi v. GE Energy (USA), L.L.C., No. 4:12-345, 2012 WL 2522599,
at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2012).
54. Id. at *4-5.
55. Id. at *5.
56. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss2/4

2015]

NOTES

361

Ultimately, every district court prior to Asadi held that Dodd-Frank’s
anti-retaliation provisions applied to internal whistleblowers.57 The Fifth
Circuit, however, disagreed with these interpretations.
III. Asadi v. GE Energy: The Fifth Circuit’s Narrow Approach to the
Protection of Internal Whistleblowers
A. Facts
In 2006, GE Energy appointed Mr. Asadi as its Iraq Country Executive
and relocated him to Jordan. 58 At a 2010 meeting, Iraqi officials told Asadi
that they believed GE Energy had hired a woman closely associated with a
senior Iraqi official for the purpose of currying favor for a lucrative joint
venture agreement. 59 Asadi, upon hearing these allegations, became
concerned that GE Energy was violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
and reported the potential violations to both his immediate supervisor and
the GE Energy ombudsperson in the region.60 Shortly after Asadi’s internal
reports, he was issued a negative performance review, and GE energy
pressured him to step down from his current position and accept a job with
less responsibility. 61 Asadi refused to step down, and GE Energy fired him
approximately one year after his internal reports. 62 Asadi filed a complaint
in federal court asserting that GE Energy violated Dodd-Frank’s
whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions by terminating him subsequent to
his internal report of possible securities violations.63
57. See Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106-07 (D. Colo. 2013); Murray v.
UBS Sec., L.L.C., No. 12 Civ.5914 (JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at *3-4, 7 (S.D.N.Y. May 21,
2013); Kramer, 2012 WL 4444820, at *4; Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F.
Supp. 2d 986, 994-95 (2012); Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011
WL 1672066, at *4-5 (May 4, 2011). Interestingly, district courts outside of the Fifth Circuit
continue to interpret the statute this way even after Asadi. See Rosenblum v. Thomson
Reuters (Markets) L.L.C., 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[I]t is plain that a
narrow reading of the statute requiring a report to the SEC conflicts with the anti-retaliation
provision, which does not have such a requirement. Thus, the governing statute is
ambiguous.”); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45-46 (D. Mass. 2013) (“It is
apparent . . . that Congress intended that an employee terminated for reporting SarbanesOxley violations to a supervisor or an outside compliance officer . . . have a private right of
action under Dodd-Frank . . . .”).
58. Asadi v. GE Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 621 (5th Cir. 2013).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015

362

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:353

B. Procedural History, Issue, and Holding
At the district court level, GE Energy moved to dismiss Asadi’s antiretaliation claims for two reasons: (1) Asadi did not qualify as a
whistleblower under Dodd-Frank, and (2) Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower
provisions did not apply to whistleblowing activity occurring outside of the
United States (extraterritorial).64 The district court did not reach a decision
regarding Asadi’s status as a whistleblower; it dismissed Asadi’s complaint
solely on the basis that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions do not
apply extraterritorially. 65
Therefore, on Asadi’s appeal, the Fifth Circuit was seemingly presented
with two issues: whether Asadi was a whistleblower and whether the
whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank applied extraterritorially.
Curiously, however, the Fifth Circuit chose not to reach a decision on the
extraterritoriality issue, the basis of the district court’s holding, and instead
only considered whether Asadi was a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank. 66
Therefore, the issue decided by the Fifth Circuit was whether the DoddFrank whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions provide a narrow exception
to the statutory definition of whistleblower, which ordinarily requires
external reporting to the SEC, for employees of public companies who
report internally. 67 The Fifth Circuit concluded that they did not and held
that “the plain language of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower-protection
provision creates a private cause of action only for individuals who provide
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the SEC.” 68
C. Decision: Tell the SEC, Not Your Boss
The Fifth Circuit “start[ed] and end[ed] [its] analysis with the text of the
relevant statute.” 69 The court found that the statutory definition of
whistleblower requires the individual to report “‘information relating to a
violation of the securities laws to the Commission,’” 70 which, “expressly
and unambiguously requires that an individual provide information to the
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 622-23 (“With these principles in mind, we turn to the question presented
in this appeal. . . . Whether an individual who is not a “whistleblower” under . . . § 78u6(a)(6) may . . . seek relief under the whistleblower protection provision.” (emphasis
added)).
67. Id. at 623.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012)).
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SEC” in order to qualify as a whistleblower under the statute.71 In other
words, to qualify as a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank, an individual must
report violations to the SEC. 72
The court then turned to Asadi’s assertion that, while he is not a
whistleblower under the general definition, he is protected under the third
category of the whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions. 73 According to
Asadi, this third category shields whistleblowers who report securities
violations internally because it protects disclosures that are similarly
protected under Sarbanes-Oxley. 74 The Fifth Circuit rejected Asadi’s
assertion outright by reiterating the fact that “[u]nder Dodd-Frank’s plain
language and structure, there is only one category of whistleblowers:
individuals who provide information relating to a securities law violation to
the SEC.” 75 The categories listed in the anti-retaliation provisions only
represent the protected activities of individuals that qualify as
whistleblowers. 76 In other words, according to the court, the categories of
protected activities cannot change the definition of whistleblower to include
individuals that did not provide information directly to the SEC.77
Therefore, under the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, the statute explains
two things: “(1) who is protected” and “(2) what actions by protected
individuals constitute protected activity.” 78 The answer to the first question
was that only whistleblowers are protected under the anti-retaliation
provisions. 79 The answer to the second question was that any of the listed
activities are protected, but only when undertaken by a whistleblower. 80
The court noted that when the text of the statute is interpreted in this way,
the meaning of the third category of protected activity is plain and
unambiguous. 81

71. Id.
72. Id. In arriving at this conclusion, the court relies on the proposition that when “a
definitional section says that a word ‘means’ something, the clear import is that this is its
only meaning.” Id. (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 226 (1st ed. 2012) [hereinafter READING LAW]).
73. Id. at 624.
74. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)).
75. Id. at 625.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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The court then rejected Asadi’s assertion that, while the language used in
the categories of protected activity is not ambiguous, it conflicts with the
definition of whistleblower. 82 Asadi’s theory rested on the fact that an
individual can take protected actions that fall within the third category, such
as internally reporting a securities violation, and still fail to qualify as a
whistleblower. 83 The court summarily dismissed this argument by noting
that Congress placed the three categories of protected activities
immediately “follow[ing] the phrase ‘[n]o employer may discharge . . . a
whistleblower . . . because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower,’”
and concluded that it was significant that Congress chose to use the term
whistleblower rather than “employee” or “individual.”84 Had Congress used
terms other than whistleblower, then Asadi’s construction would be valid
because it would clearly show that Congress intended persons other than
statutorily-defined whistleblowers to be protected from retaliation.85 Yet,
because Congress used the term “whistleblower,” the court must give effect
to the language of the statute. 86
Next, the court addressed Asadi’s argument that limiting the scope of the
anti-retaliation provisions to individuals that report violations externally to
the SEC renders the third category of protected activity superfluous.87 In
response, the court gave an example of a limited fact-pattern under which
the third category would not be superfluous.88 According to the court, the
third category of protected activity would protect an employee that
simultaneously reported a securities law violation to her CEO and to the
SEC. 89 If the CEO, who was unaware of the employee’s disclosure to the
SEC, fired the employee because of the internal disclosure, then the
employee could avail herself of the third category of protected activity. 90
Clearly, the employee would be a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank because
she reported a securities violation to the SEC.91 The employee, however,
would be unable to prove that she was retaliated against because of her

82. Id. at 626-27.
83. Id. at 626.
84. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 627.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. The court’s logic applies equally to a situation where an employee initially
reports a violation to the SEC and then reports internally.
90. Id. at 627-28.
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
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disclosure to the SEC. 92 Here, the employee could rely upon the third
category of protected activity, which protects her internal disclosure by
incorporating the protections of Sarbanes-Oxley. 93 Therefore, the employee
“can state a claim under the Dodd-Frank whistleblower-protection
provision because [she] was a ‘whistleblower’ and suffered retaliation
based on [her] disclosure to the CEO, which was protected under
[Sarbanes-Oxley].” 94
The court then commented that Asadi’s construction of the statute was
problematic for another reason: it “render[ed] the [Sarbanes-Oxley] antiretaliation provision, for practical purposes, moot.” 95 Specifically, Asadi’s
construction would allow any individual that makes a disclosure protected
under Sarbanes-Oxley to bring a claim under the Dodd-Frank antiretaliation provisions on the basis that the disclosure was protected by the
third category of the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provisions. 96 In fact,
according to the court, it would be unlikely that an individual would ever
bring a claim under Sarbanes-Oxley rather than Dodd-Frank because DoddFrank provides greater monetary damages, direct access to federal court,
and a significantly longer statute of limitations. 97
Finally, the court concluded its analysis by asserting that the SEC’s
definition of whistleblower should not receive any deference.98
Specifically, the SEC’s interpretation is incorrect because it “redefines
‘whistleblower’ more broadly by providing that an individual qualifies as a
whistleblower even though he never reports any information to the SEC, so
long as he has undertaken the protected activity listed in [the anti-retaliation
provisions].” 99 In other words, the regulation violates the plain language of
the statute by defining whistleblower more broadly for the anti-retaliation
provisions than for the bounty provisions. 100 Because Congress has already
unambiguously defined the term whistleblower, the court rejected the
SEC’s expansive whistleblower definition. 101

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 627.
Id. at 627-28.
Id. at 628.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 628-29.
Id. at 629.
Id.
See id. at 629-30.
Id.
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Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit rejected Asadi’s claim because he did not
report directly to the SEC, which the court held was a necessary predicate
for Asadi to avail himself of the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provisions. 102
IV. Analysis: Blowing the Whistle on Asadi v. GE Energy
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Asadi is incorrect for several reasons. As
a matter of statutory construction, the court placed too much weight on the
definitional section while ignoring contrary textual indicators. Also, the
court ignored the legislative purpose behind Dodd-Frank—promoting
financial stability. In fact, internal whistleblowing plays an integral role in
early detection of fraud.103 Unlike the Fifth Circuit’s definition, the SEC’s
definition of whistleblower maintains the emphasis on internal reporting
created by Sarbanes-Oxley. 104 This allows internal whistleblowers to avoid
the procedural hurdles that have dampened Sarbanes-Oxley’s effectiveness.
A. “Whistleblower” or Whistleblower? The Term’s Multiple Meanings
The Fifth Circuit’s decision fails as a matter of statutory interpretation
because it places too much weight on applying the definition of
whistleblower uniformly throughout the statute, despite contrary textual
indicators. Also, it renders much of the language contained in the antiretaliation provisions superfluous. The court was correct in noting that,
generally speaking, when a definitional section “says that a word ‘means’
something, the clear import is that this is its only meaning.” 105 Yet, while it
is “rare that a defined meaning can be replaced with another permissible
meaning of the word on the basis of other textual indications,” it is “not
inconceivable.” 106 Definitions are nothing more than a strong indication of
a word’s meaning, and the definition can be contradicted by other textual
indications of meaning. 107 Courts can apply different interpretations to the
102. Id.
103. See infra Part IV.C.
104. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1)(i)-(ii) (2014).
105. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623 (quoting READING LAW, supra note 72, at 226).
106. READING LAW, supra note 72, at 228.
107. Id.; see also NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S.
251, 262 (1995) (citation omitted) (“[A] characterization fitting in certain contexts may be
unsuitable in others.”); Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433
(1932) (citation omitted) (“Undoubtedly, there is a natural presumption that identical words
used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning. . . . But the
presumption is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is such variation in the connection
in which the words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were
employed in different parts of the act with different intent.”).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss2/4

2015]

NOTES

367

same word throughout a statute in order to give the word the meaning that
Congress intended. 108
There are clear textual indicators that Congress intended to define
whistleblower differently for the purposes of the anti-retaliation provisions.
Contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s assertions, applying the general definition of
whistleblower to the anti-retaliation provisions does in fact render much of
the anti-retaliation provision’s text superfluous. The surplusage canon holds
that every provision of a statute should be given effect, and, “[b]ecause
legal drafters should not include words that have no effect, courts [should]
avoid a reading that renders some words altogether redundant.”109 Here, the
court’s application of the general definition of whistleblower to the antiretaliation provisions violates the surplusage canon and renders much of the
statute superfluous in three ways.
First, applying the general definition of whistleblower to the antiretaliation provisions renders the first protected activity of the antiretaliation provisions redundant. 110 The first category protects
“whistleblowers” that “provid[e] information to the Commission.”111
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit’s application of the general definition of
whistleblower to this section essentially transforms the meaning of the
statute into “an individual who reports violations directly to the SEC is
protected when she reports violations to the SEC” or “a whistleblower is
protected when she is a whistleblower.” This interpretation renders the first
category of protected activity redundant because Congress could have
merely specified that whistleblowers are protected, which, under the
general definition, already protects whistleblowers when they report to the
SEC. Congress’s decision to specify that whistleblowers are protected when
they report information to the SEC strongly indicates that the term
whistleblower, when used in the anti-retaliation provision, is used in its
more ordinary, general sense, and the term is not limited to employees that
report securities law violations to the SEC . 112
108. Atl. Cleaners, 286 U.S. at 433 (“[T]here is no rule of statutory construction which
precludes the courts from giving to the word the meaning which the Legislature intended it
should have in each instance.”).
109. READING LAW, supra note 72, at 176.
110. Again, the general definition of whistleblower under Dodd-Frank is “any individual
who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the
Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
111. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i).
112. For example, the term could merely refer to an employee that reports wrongdoing,
whether internally or externally.
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Second, the court’s interpretation renders the third category of protected
activity effectively moot. 113 When it held that the text is not superfluous,
the Fifth Circuit invented an implausible fact pattern under which an
employee reports a violation of securities laws to both the SEC and her
company’s management. 114 Yet, when this employee reports internally to
her company’s management, she inexplicably does not mention the fact that
she also reported externally and is fired solely on the basis of her internal
reporting. 115 This fact pattern ignores the practical reality that the vast
majority of whistleblowers choose to only report internally and never report
externally. 116 In fact, according to 2011 data regarding the behavior of
whistleblowers, only 3% of whistleblower reports are initially made
externally rather than internally. 117 Thus, under the Fifth Circuit’s
interpretation, the vast majority of whistleblowers who report internally do
not receive any protection from anti-retaliation under Dodd-Frank; instead,
only the 3% that initially report externally receive protection.
Also, the fact pattern under which employees report violations externally
prior to reporting internally ignores the fact that whistleblowers choose to
report internally or externally based on different factors, and rarely would
these factors lead a whistleblower to report externally prior to reporting
internally. The prime reason that employees choose to report internally
rather than externally is to report to somebody that the employee knows and
trusts, either her direct supervisor or higher management. 118 In contrast,
employees frequently choose to report externally when they do not trust
their managers because they perceive the ethics or overall culture of senior
management to be weak. 119 Also, employees are more likely to report

113. Specifically, the statute states that whistleblowers are protected when they “mak[e]
disclosures that are required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).
114. See Asadi v. GE Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 627 (5th Cir. 2013).
115. Id.
116. One survey found that in 2011, among employees that report wrongdoing, only 18%
eventually report outside of their company. Inside the Mind of a Whistleblower, ETHICS
RESOURCE CENTER 13 (2012), www.ethics.org/files/us/reportingfinal.pdf. A 2010 survey,
examining four years of data, found that 90% of whistleblowers that eventually seek bounty
awards initially report violations internally. Impact of Qui Tam Laws on Internal
Compliance: A Report to the Securities Exchange Commission, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWERS
CENTER 5 (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.whistleblowers.org/storage/whistleblowers/docume
nts/DoddFrank/nwcreporttosecfinal.pdf.
117. Inside the Mind of a Whistleblower, supra note 116, at 13.
118. Id. at 11.
119. Id. at 13.
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externally as the severity of the violation increases.120 Given these
motivations, it seems highly improbable that an employee who chooses to
report externally because of a perceived lack of trust or ethics in a
company’s top management would then choose to report internally to those
that she considers untrustworthy and unethical. Also, if an employee reports
externally because of the perceived severity of an issue, it similarly makes
little sense that, after the employee has taken the drastic step of externally
reporting in order to address a problem of great severity, she would then
choose to take the less drastic step of reporting internally.
Third, the conflict between the general definition of whistleblower and
the third category of protected activity is greater than the Fifth Circuit
acknowledges. The Fifth Circuit focuses solely on the potential conflict
between who can report under the anti-retaliation provisions and concludes
that only those who report to the SEC can benefit from the anti-retaliation
protections. 121 Yet, the third category of protected activity under the antiretaliation provisions conflicts with the general definition of whistleblower
for a second reason. Specifically, the two provisions conflict regarding what
types of disclosures are protected. Dodd-Frank’s general definition of
whistleblower requires an individual to report “information relating to a
violation of the securities laws.” 122 In contrast, Dodd-Frank’s third category
of whistleblower activity shields disclosures that are similarly protected
under Sarbanes-Oxley, and the disclosures protected under Sarbanes-Oxley
are significantly broader than just information relating to a violation of the
securities laws. 123 Specifically, Sarbanes-Oxley protects disclosures that
relate to mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and commodities fraud, as well
as those relating to “any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against
shareholders.” 124
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit’s application of the general definition of
whistleblower to the third category of the anti-retaliation provisions
eviscerates the Sarbanes-Oxley protection of disclosures relating to matters
other than “violation[s] of the securities laws,” and renders the Dodd-Frank
protection of “disclosures that are required or protected under the Sarbanes120. Id. at 14.
121. See Asadi v. GE Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Under
Dodd-Frank’s plain language and structure, there is only one category of whistleblowers:
individuals who provide information relating to a securities law violation to the SEC.”).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012) (emphasis added).
123. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2012).
124. Id. § 1514A(a)(1).
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Oxley Act of 2002” superfluous. 125 Under the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation,
employees could only benefit from the Sarbanes-Oxley protections, such as
the protection for disclosure of mail fraud or bank fraud, under Dodd-Frank
if the employee has initially reported a violation relating to securities laws
to the SEC. 126 This result makes little sense because it suggests that an
employee would not be protected under Dodd-Frank if she chose to initially
report a violation of the mail fraud statute internally. But the same
employee would be protected under Dodd-Frank if she reported a violation
of the mail fraud statute internally after reporting a violation of securities
laws to the SEC. Under this scenario, the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation
raises more questions than it answers. For example, would the internallyreported violations of Sarbanes-Oxley have to be related to the previouslyreported violations of securities laws to the SEC? Or can an employee that
first reports violations of the securities laws to the SEC, thus qualifying her
as a statutory whistleblower, then internally report completely unrelated
violations and still receive the protections of Dodd-Frank? Because of this
potential confusion, the only way to give full effect to Dodd-Frank’s
protection of disclosures that are protected under Sarbanes-Oxley is to
define whistleblower differently for the purpose of the anti-retaliation
provisions. This secondary definition of whistleblower would not require
that a whistleblower first report violations of securities laws to the SEC in
order to benefit from the anti-retaliation provisions.
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit’s application of the general definition of
whistleblower to the anti-retaliation provisions of Dodd-Frank fails as a
matter of statutory construction because it renders two of the protected
activities redundant or superfluous. Specifically, with regard to the third
category of protected activity, the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation effectively
eliminates Dodd-Frank’s protection of disclosures that are protected under
Sarbanes-Oxley by dramatically limiting both who can report violations
internally and the types of reported violations that are protected.
B. Who Cares About Sarbanes-Oxley? Rendering Its Anti-Retaliation
Provisions Moot Is Consistent with Dodd-Frank’s Purpose
The Fifth Circuit notes with disapproval that allowing internal reporting
under Dodd-Frank would effectively invalidate Sarbanes-Oxley’s antiretaliation provisions because all claims that could be brought under

125. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6), (h)(1)(A)(iii).
126. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 624 (holding that employees must meet the statutory definition of
whistleblower to be protected from anti-retaliation under Dodd-Frank).
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Sarbanes-Oxley could instead be brought under Dodd-Frank. 127 The Fifth
Circuit does not, however, explain why this result is bad or why it is
inconsistent with the purpose of Dodd-Frank: “promot[ing] the financial
stability of the United States” through “accountability and transparency.” 128
Instead, the Fifth Circuit paradoxically supports its disapproval by noting
all of the ways that Dodd-Frank increases the protections for
whistleblowers, including a longer statute of limitations, greater monetary
damages, and direct access to federal courts. 129 In fact, increasing the
protection of whistleblowers by allowing them to bring anti-retaliation
claims protected by Sarbanes-Oxley through Dodd-Frank is entirely
consistent with the purpose of Dodd-Frank.
Dodd-Frank seeks to achieve its goal of promoting financial stability by
“establishing an early warning system to detect and address emerging
threats to financial stability and the economy” and “strengthening the
supervision of large complex financial organizations.”130 Unfortunately, the
legislative history of the whistleblower provisions is sparse and virtually
non-existent. 131 Congress evidently held no hearings to examine existing
whistleblower law or potential changes thereto.132 The lack of legislative
history is especially prevalent with regard to the anti-retaliation provisions.
The third category of anti-retaliation provisions does not appear in the
Dodd-Frank bill until after the conference committee between the House

127. Id. at 628.
128. Id. at 628-29; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
129. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 629.
130. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 2 (2010).
131. Recent Legislation, Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376,
1841-49 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6), 124 HARV. L. REV. 1829, 1830 (2011)
(“[T]he whistleblower provisions received little attention on the road to passage.”).
132. Legislative Proposals to Address the Negative Consequences of the Dodd-Frank
Whistleblower Provisions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets and
Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 112th Cong. 1
(2011) (statement of Rep. Garrett, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Capital Markets and
Government Sponsored Enterprises). In a hearing on the whistleblower provisions held after
the passage of Dodd-Frank, one Representative coyly noted that holding the hearing was
“appropriate in a better-late-than-never kind of way.” Id. “What would have been more
appropriate is if [Congress] had prior to this a full and robust discussion about potential
adjustments to the SEC whistleblower program.” Id. “And if they had done that before the
provisions were signed into law.” Id.
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and the Senate. 133 The versions of the bill that were introduced in the
House, passed by the House, and passed by the Senate all protect just two
types of whistleblower activity: reporting violations of securities laws to the
SEC and participating in a judicial or administrative action.134 Therefore,
there is little evidence of what Congress intended the third category of
protected activity to encompass. Additionally, there is no evidence of what
meaning, if any, should be ascribed to the provision’s late addition to the
bill.
Further, while the Senate Report discusses the purposes of the
whistleblower bounty provisions at length, it only makes a passing
reference to the anti-retaliation provisions. 135 At one point, however, the
Senate Report notes that the bill “also expands existing whistleblower
law.” 136 This comment immediately follows a sentence focusing
exclusively on the bounty provisions. 137 Therefore, the clear implication is
that the anti-retaliation provisions are designed to expand existing
whistleblower law in addition to the bounty provisions.
Given the lack of specific legislative history regarding the whistleblower
anti-retaliation provisions, the provisions should be interpreted according to
the legislative purpose: promoting financial stability through accountability
and transparency. 138 To this end, courts should interpret the Dodd-Frank
anti-retaliation provisions broadly because whistleblowers play an integral
role in detecting and preventing corporate fraud. 139 Studies have
133. Compare H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 922(h)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (as passed by Senate, May
20, 2010), available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr4173/text/eas, with 15
U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (2012).
134. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 7203 (as introduced in House, Dec. 2, 2009),
available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr4173/text/ih; H.R. 4173, 111th
Cong. § 7203 (as passed by House, Dec. 11, 2009), available at https://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/111/hr4173/text/eh; H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 922 (as passed by Senate, May
20, 2010), available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr4173/text/eas.
135. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 111-12 (2010)
136. Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
137. Id. (“The SEC would have more help in identifying securities law violations through
a new, robust whistleblower program designed to motivate people who know of securities
law violations to tell the SEC.”).
138. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173,
111th Cong. (2010).
139. See Chelsea Hunt Overhuls, Comment, Unfinished Business: Dodd-Frank’s
Whistleblower Anti-Retaliation Protections Fall Short for Private Companies and Their
Employees, 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 1, 4 (2012) (“The role whistleblowers play in
preventing and detecting fraud is more than conceptual.”); Timothy J. Fitzmaurice, Note,
The Scope of Protected Activity Under Section 806 of SOX, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2041, 2046
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consistently confirmed the importance of whistleblowers. A 2012 report by
the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners analyzed 1388 cases of fraud
and found that tipsters accounted for 43.3% of the initial detections of
fraud. 140 Employee-whistleblowers accounted for 50.9% of the tips within
the study (or roughly 22% of all initial detections of fraud). 141 A similar
study of 216 cases of alleged corporate frauds between 1996 and 2004
found that employees accounted for 17% of initial detections of corporate
fraud, whereas the SEC accounted for only 7% of the initial detections. 142
Employees also detected a higher percentage of corporate fraud than
financial analysts, auditors, short sellers, equity holders, the media, and
non-financial market regulators. 143 The reasons why employeewhistleblowers report fraud at a higher percentage than other groups is
simple: fraud is likely clandestine or hidden, and employees, as insiders to
the company, have access to information that is unavailable to the public or
to regulators. 144
The incentives against an employee blowing the whistle, however, are
quite strong. In a large number of cases the whistleblower is fired, quits
under duress, or has her responsibilities significantly altered. 145 In light of
the possible consequences, one of the main reasons that employees do not
blow the whistle is because of fear of employer retaliation, either through
termination or demotion.146 Given the strong disincentives against blowing

(2012) (citation omitted) (“[Whistleblowers] are indispensible to detecting and preventing
corporate fraud.”).
140. ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL
FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2012 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 14 (2012), http://www.acfe.com/upload
edFiles/ACFE_Website/Content/rttn/2012-report-to-nations.pdf.
141. Id. at 16.
142. Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on
Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2214 (2010).
143. Id.
144. See ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, 2008 REPORT TO THE NATION ON
OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE 8 (2008), http://www.acfe.com/uploadedFiles/ACFE_
Website/Content/documents/2008-rttn.pdf (“One of the primary characteristics of fraud is
that it is clandestine, or hidden; almost all fraud involves the attempted concealment of the
crime.”); Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 142, at 2240 (“Employees clearly have the
best access to information. Few, if any, frauds can be committed without the knowledge and
often the support of several employees.”).
145. Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 142, at 2240 (noting 82% of whistleblowers
were “fired, quite under duress, or had significantly altered responsibilities”).
146. Rachel Beller, Note, Whistleblower Protection Legislation of the East and West:
Can It Really Reduce Corporate Fraud and Improve Corporate Governance? A Study of the
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the whistle, the law must encourage potential whistleblowers by providing
strong employer anti-retaliation provisions. 147 It is here—the protection of
whistleblowers against employer retaliation—that Sarbanes-Oxley has been
a failure.
An empirical study conducted by Professor Richard E. Moberly,
analyzing 700 administrative investigations and hearings from the first
three years of Sarbanes-Oxley, reveals a startling lack of success for
whistleblowers that brought anti-retaliation claims. 148 According to
Professor Moberly, only 3.6% (13 out of 361) of whistleblowers were
successful after filing a complaint with OSHA, the first stage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley administrative process.149 On appeal to ALJs, only 6.5% (6
out of 93) of whistleblowers were successful in their anti-retaliation
claims. 150 The futility of bringing an anti-retaliation claim, however, was
not limited to the first three years after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.
From 2002 until 2011, employees were successful in only 1.8% of the 1260
cases decided by OSHA, and between 2006 and 2008, “OSHA did not
decide a single case in favor of a Sarbanes-Oxley claimant.” 151
Professor Moberly advanced several reasons for the low success rates,
including the short statute of limitations period152 and misapplication of the
employee-friendly burden of proof. 153 During the study period, OSHA
rejected 18.8% of employee claims for failure to meet the statute of
limitations period, and ALJs rejected 33.8% of claims for failure to meet
the statute of limitations.154
When OSHA resolved cases on the merits and determined whether the
employee-claimant was fired for undertaking a protected activity, the
Successes and Failures of Whistleblower Protection Legislation in the US and China, 7
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 873, 875 (2011).
147. See id. at 881; Overhuls, supra note 139, at 4.
148. Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why
Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 66-67 (2007)
[hereinafter Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations].
149. Id. Of course, a low success rate might just be indicative of poor claims; however,
even accounting for the possibility of weak claims, the success rate under Sarbanes-Oxley
seems abnormally low.
150. Id.
151. Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64
S.C. L. REV. 1, 29 (2012) (citation omitted).
152. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 148, at 107.
153. Id. at 120. Other reasons for the low-success rate include OSHA and the ALJs
strictly construing which employers and activities are covered. Id. at 110-20.
154. Id. at 107. At the time of the study, however, the statute of limitations to bring a
claim under Sarbanes-Oxley was ninety days rather than 180 days. Id.
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evidence suggests that OSHA failed to apply Sarbanes-Oxley’s employeefriendly burden of proof. 155 It should be a relatively easy burden for
employees to prove that their protected activity was a contributing factor in
their retaliation.156 In 69.4% of OSHA cases that considered the causation
issue, however, OSHA concluded that the employee did not meet this low
burden of proof. 157 Further, when the burden was shifted back to the
employer to show by clear and convincing evidence that the retaliation was
unrelated to the employee’s protected activity, OSHA resolved cases in
favor of the employer 64.9% of the time—a fairly high percentage in light
of the high burden of “clear and convincing” evidence.158
The Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provisions eliminate both of these
Sarbanes-Oxley procedural hurdles by extending the statute of limitations
to at least six years and allowing employees to bring claims directly in
federal courts. 159 In turn, federal courts are more able to correctly apply
burdens of proof than administrative agencies.160 In light of Dodd-Frank’s
purpose of promoting financial stability and the critical role that
whistleblowers play in detecting fraud, it makes little sense to fix SarbanesOxley’s problems solely for the small minority of whistleblowers that
initially report externally. 161 Instead, it is far more consistent with DoddFrank’s purpose to recognize that Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions
fix several of the problems that were prevalent in Sarbanes-Oxley and to
broadly apply the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provisions to whistleblowers
that report both externally and internally.
C. Internal Whistleblowers Matter: The Fifth Circuit Ignores the Critical
Role that Internal Reporting Plays in Detecting Securities Violations
The Fifth Circuit’s failure to protect internal reporting under Dodd-Frank
undermines the internal compliance mechanisms mandated by SarbanesOxley and exacerbates the perverse incentive for employees to report
externally under Dodd-Frank’s bounty provision. Internal reporting and

155. Id. at 122.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 123.
159. See supra Part II.B.1 (describing the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions).
160. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 148, at 147.
161. Again, one study suggested that only 3% of whistleblowers initially report
externally. Inside the Mind of a Whistleblower, supra note 116, at 11-13. See supra notes
113-120 and accompanying text for a comparison of whistleblowers that choose to report
internally versus externally.
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compliance programs are at the heart of Sarbanes-Oxley. 162 Sarbanes-Oxley
requires companies to establish and maintain internal control and reporting
structures. 163 Each year, companies must include an assessment of the
effectiveness of the internal control structure in their annual reports. 164
Also, companies must have an independent auditor sign off on
management’s report on the effectiveness of internal controls.165 In the
wake of Sarbanes-Oxley, companies expended considerable time and effort
to set up strong internal compliance programs in order to encourage
employees to report violations internally. 166
Sarbanes-Oxley’s emphasis on internal reporting is well placed. The
SEC has consistently reaffirmed that internal reporting is a critical tool to
detect fraud within companies because it facilitates compliance with federal
securities laws. 167 Internal compliance programs are consistent with “best
practices” in the field of corporate compliance because they place
information about potential violations in the hands of employees with
“access to first-hand information [who] are in the best position to detect and
prevent potential securities violations.”168 Internal reporting allows
companies to take immediate action to investigate and solve any reported
violations, rather than wait weeks, months, or years to be informed of
potential violations by the SEC. 169 Further, internal control programs

162. The remedies for whistleblowers that are retaliated against have been lacking under
Sarbanes Oxley. See supra Part IV.B. In spite of this, the internal reporting mechanism
mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley is beneficial. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a)-(b) (2012).
163. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a)-(b).
164. Id.
165. Id. § 7262(b).
166. See Matt A. Vega, Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing Moral in
the New Era of Dodd-Frank Act “Bounty Hunting”, 45 CONN. L. REV. 483, 519 (2012);
Shannon Kay Quigley, Comment, Whistleblower Tug-of-War: Corporate Attempts to Secure
Internal Reporting Procedures in the Face of External Monetary Incentives Provided by the
Dodd-Frank Act, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 264-65 (2012).
167. See 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,323 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
240, 249) (“[C]ompliance with the Federal securities laws is promoted when companies
have effective programs for identifying, correcting, and self-reporting unlawful conduct . . .
. [I]nternal compliance and reporting systems are essential sources of information for
companies . . . .”).
168. Vega, supra note 166, at 519.
169. U.S. Chamber Warns New SEC Whistleblower Rule Will Undermine Corporate
Compliance Programs, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (May 24, 2011),
http://www.uschamber.com/press-release/us-chamber-warns-new-sec-whistleblower-rule-willundermine-corporate-compliance (“Not informing the company of a potential fraud and
waiting for the SEC to act is the equivalent of not calling the firefighters down the street to put
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encourage a culture of compliance within a company and can often lead
companies “to achieve norms that are actually better than what the law
requires.” 170
The Dodd-Frank whistleblower bounty provisions,171 however, threaten
internal compliance programs by providing incentives for employees to
report potential securities violations directly to the SEC. 172 Encouraging
external reporting over internal reporting is problematic for several reasons.
First, the bounty provisions require whistleblowers to report original
information to the SEC.173 Therefore, employees are more likely to rush to
report information about securities violations to the SEC—without
verifying the information’s accuracy—in order to be the first party to report
the violation. 174 This rush to report violations without verification leads, in
turn, to the second problem with external reporting: flooding the SEC with
frivolous tips. 175 The SEC, burdened with a flood of frivolous tips, may
have trouble distinguishing legitimate tips of securities violations from
meritless ones, and it will have to spend time and effort weeding out the
frivolous tips rather than focusing on correcting legitimate violations of
securities laws. 176 Finally, encouraging employees to race to report
violations to the SEC undermines the culture of corporate compliance that
companies set up in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley. 177 The bounty program
will “promote the very culture of opportunism that these [internal]
compliance systems are intended to combat.” 178
Recognizing the benefits of internal compliance programs, and the
potential perverse incentives to bypass internal compliance programs in
light of the bounty provisions, the SEC’s final rules for the bounty program
seek to incentivize internal reporting in several ways. First, whistleblowers
out a raging fire and instead calling the lawyers from the next town to sue over the fire
instead.”).
170. Vega, supra note 166, at 520.
171. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2012).
172. Vega, supra note 166, at 519-21.
173. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(3)(B) (providing that original information is information “not
known to the Commission from any other source”).
174. Jessica Luhrs, Note, Encouraging Litigation: Why Dodd-Frank Goes Too Far in
Eliminating the Procedural Difficulties in Sarbanes-Oxley, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 175, 183
(2012).
175. Dave Ebersole, Comment, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower
Provisions, 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123, 135-36 (2011).
176. Luhrs, supra note 174, at 183-84.
177. Vega, supra note 166, at 520.
178. Id.
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are still eligible to receive the bounty if the employee first reports the
information through her company’s internal compliance program and the
company later reports the violation to the SEC.179 Second, if the employee
initially reports information relating to a potential violation through her
company’s internal compliance program and then reports the violation to
the SEC within 120 days of the internal report, the SEC will consider the
employee to have reported the information directly to the SEC on the date
of internal disclosure for the purposes of the bounty provisions. 180 Third,
and perhaps most critically, a whistleblower’s participation and assistance
in her company’s internal compliance program before or at the same time
she reports the violation to the SEC is a “plus” factor that can increase the
amount of the bounty award. 181 Conversely, interference with her
company’s internal compliance programs is a negative factor, which can
decrease the amount of the whistleblower’s bounty. 182
The SEC’s encouragement of internal reporting for the purposes of the
bounty provision, however, has one major flaw. In order to receive the
bounty, a whistleblower must provide information that leads to a successful
enforcement action.183 In other words, if the information does not lead to a
successful prosecution for a violation of securities laws, the whistleblower
receives nothing. Viewed through this lens, a whistleblower’s decision to
report internally prior to reporting externally is fraught with peril. If the
whistleblower reports information through her company’s internal
compliance system, she runs the risk of facing retaliation in the form of
firing or demotion. Consider the following hypothetical: A whistleblower
initially reports a violation internally and is fired. Then, within 120 days,
she reports the information to the SEC, and is thus eligible to receive a
bounty. Unfortunately for the whistleblower, the information that she
provided to the SEC did not lead to a successful enforcement action, so she
does not receive a bounty. Therefore, her only recourse is to rely on antiretaliation provisions to provide her with reinstatement and back pay.
Under the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation
provisions, however, she would not receive any protection because she

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(c)(3) (2012).
Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(7).
Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(4).
Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(3).
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1)(A) (2012).
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initially reported the violation internally rather than to the SEC. 184 Any
rational whistleblower with knowledge of the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation
would bypass her company’s internal compliance programs, regardless of
the SEC’s incentives to report internally. This hypothetical, therefore,
indicates the extent to which the Fifth Circuit’s decision undermines the
SEC’s efforts to encourage internal reporting under the bounty provisions.
And because the SEC’s incentives were designed to encourage continued
participation in successful corporate compliance systems in spite of the
bounty provisions, the Fifth Circuit’s decision threatens to undermine all
internal corporate compliance programs.
V. Administrative Deference and a Novel Proposal
A. Just Defer: The SEC’s Definition and Chevron Deference
Under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
courts must defer to an administrative agency’s regulation if it is a
permissible construction of an ambiguous statute.185 Determining whether a
court should defer to an administrative agency is a multi-step process.
Initially, the court must determine if the intent of Congress is clear—if so,
then the court “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.” 186 If the statute is ambiguous with regard to a specific issue,
however, then courts must determine whether the agency’s interpretation
“is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” 187 If so, then courts
must defer. 188
The Fifth Circuit erred by finding that Dodd-Frank’s definition of
whistleblower is unambiguous and by failing to defer to the SEC’s nuanced
definition of whistleblower. 189 In fact, the term whistleblower is highly
ambiguous throughout the text of the statute. 190 Although Dodd-Frank
contains an explicit definition of whistleblower, numerous textual
indicators lead to the conclusion that the term means something else
entirely when used in the anti-retaliation provisions.191
184. While she could rely on the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower anti-retaliation
provisions, these provisions have proven to be a complete failure at protecting
whistleblowers from retaliation. See supra Part IV.B.
185. 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
186. Id. at 842-43.
187. Id. at 843.
188. Id. At 843-44.
189. See Asadi v. GE Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 629-30 (5th Cir. 2013).
190. See supra Part IV.A.
191. See supra Part IV.A.
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Further, because the term whistleblower is ambiguous, courts should
defer to the SEC’s definition because it is a permissible construction of the
statute. The SEC’s definition recognizes the conflict between the general
definition of whistleblower and the anti-retaliation provisions. 192 By
carving out an exception to the general definition, the SEC prevents much
of the text of the anti-retaliation provisions from becoming superfluous.193
Also, the SEC’s definition is consistent with Dodd-Frank’s purpose of
maintaining financial stability. It ensures that internal reporting—a critical
fraud detection tool—remains at the heart of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower
provisions. 194
B. A Novel Proposal
Although courts can and should defer to the SEC’s definition of
whistleblower, the SEC can effectively overturn the Asadi decision by rule.
The general definition of whistleblower under Dodd-Frank is “any
individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the
securities laws to the Commission.” 195 The second half of the definition
further provides that the disclosure must be made to the SEC “in a manner
established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.” 196 Therefore, DoddFrank explicitly authorizes the SEC to determine how individuals report
violations to the SEC. In situations like this, where Congress has expressly
delegated authority to an administrative agency, courts must defer to
agency regulations.197
In light of its broad authority to determine the manner in which
violations are reported to the SEC, the SEC can establish that internallyreported violations are—by rule—reported to the SEC. In other words, the
SEC should proclaim that one of the ways to report violations to the SEC is
to report violations through internal company channels. This rule would be
consistent with the statutory text and allow the SEC to maintain its nuanced
definition of whistleblower, even after Asadi.

192. See supra Part IV.A.
193. See supra Part IV.A.
194. See supra Part IV.C.
195. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
196. Id.
197. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984) (“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”).
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VI. Conclusion
Congress passed Dodd-Frank in response to the financial crisis that
began in 2008—the worst crisis since the Great Depression. Whistleblowers
are essential to the early detection and prevention of fraud, and DoddFrank’s whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions play an integral role in
preventing another financial crisis. The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Asadi,
however, ignores the purpose behind Dodd-Frank by dramatically
decreasing the protections available for whistleblowers. The Fifth Circuit’s
holding that internal whistleblowers are not protected under Dodd-Frank
places too much weight on the definition of whistleblower and ignores
contrary textual indicators. In fact, the term whistleblower is ambiguous
within the section containing the anti-retaliation provisions. Instead of
adopting the Fifth Circuit’s view, courts should defer to the SEC’s
definition of whistleblower because it properly recognizes the value of
internal whistleblowers.
Even when courts, like Asadi, refuse to defer, the SEC can avoid the
problem entirely by establishing a rule that mandates internal reporting as
one of the ways to report violations to the SEC. Such a rule would be
permissible because Dodd-Frank expressly grants the SEC the power to
determine the manner in which whistleblowers report violations to the SEC.
Jeff Vogt
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